Mentioned on Nanaplaza.com | 3.12.05
Just when I was about to retreat into my bi-weekly self-questioning blog hiatus, Sarasonteh was linked to by a Nanaplaza.com poster who calls it “excellent”. Thanks for that, Suadum.
Still, I don’t know whether to be happy or sad by this comment:
I just wish I could find an anti-Toxin/TRT site that is as well done as K. Tom’s. Most “anti” arguments seem to lack real substance :-( and instead are little better than name-calling.
Nationmultimedia.com isn’t enough? How about bangkokpost.com? Or how about a gazillion other sources of “anti” stuff both on-line and off-line? If he can’t find real substance in such a plethora of choices — and for this Suadum is already smarter than perhaps 98% of non-Thais — why won’t he consider the possibility that maybe, just maybe, there is no real substance to speak of?
Suadum’s description of me as “very pro-Toxin/TRT” notwithstanding, I feel the need to say something about this comment from Gadfly1:
I was troubled by their opposition to the US-Thai FTA and arguments against privitization of state enterprises, but figured it was temporary political posturing, much like Kerry’s pre-election pandering to protectionist groups in the US (Kerry has a pro-free trade track record in the Senate, and you could tell his heart really wasn’t in supporting protectionist groups and my hope, in supporting him, was that, once elected, he would continue his support for free trade (we’ll never know)). But in the case of the Democrats here, the blog makes it sounds as though there may be a bit more substance, or at least history, to their nationalism. Very troubling. [Link added.]
Although the Democrats have been making terrible noises about free trade, privatization, and capitalism in general — and I’m glad that it is finally being noticed — I concede that most of it is probably “just” demagogic opportunism. Still, by cynically riding the populist and nationalist wave, backed by the full force of the media, “academia”, and Sondhi “We’ll fight for the King™” Limthongkul, they are painting themselves into the corner. The position the Democrats have put themselves in is not John Kerry’s on free trade, but more akin to Howard Dean’s on Iraq. If they return to power in a not-to-distant future (which they of course hope to do), they’ll be under tremendous pressure to make good on their rhetoric and campaign promises. The admission of Perayot Rahimmula into their party-list ranks doesn’t help, either.
My reader JW is fond of reminding me that Thaksin and the TRT were using the same tactic back in 2000. I doubt it was to the same extent. Their much-ballyhooed platform in 2000 certainly wasn’t as populist as the Democrats’ in 2005. In any case, the TRT was then (and is even now) described as populist and nationalist, was it not? The Democrats, on the contrary, were fulsomely praised as “technocratic and progressive” by The Economist as recently as February this year.
22:37 ▪ politics
« TPI update: bye-bye, Prachai | Main | C-130 and Thaksin’s sister »
- 1
- JW 4.12.05
I concede that most of it is probably “just” demagogic opportunism.
That is still why I hold out some hope for the Democrats - I’ll admit it I am a bit of a fan of Abhisit as well. I try not to pay to much attention to everything that the Democrats say now, but you are right the Democrats would face real problems if they were to win and not to follow through with their promises. But if the economy is going strongly in four years, some might forget about those promises made four years earlier.
My reader JW is fond of reminding me that Thaksin and the TRT were using the same tactic back in 2000. I doubt it was to the same extent.
I’ll do some further research on this and post next week on this.
In any case, the TRT was then (and is even now) described as populist and nationalist, was it not?
I must say I have persuaded by your arguments that TRT is not as nationalist and populist as the western media perceives it to be. TRT have been labelled as populist and nationalist and the label has stuck. I think the Democrats saw how badly they failed in the 2001 election and decided to go down, what they saw as the TRT route with populist and nationalist policies. Unfortunately, for them they were 4 years too late.
- 2
- Tom Vamvanij 4.12.05
JW:
I’ll admit it I am a bit of a fan of Abhisit as well.
Why? It’s obviously not what he says, so the way he looks perhaps? He is, after all, known as “Big Handsome”, as distinct from other Democrat Handsomes such as Middle Handsome and Little Handsome and Tall Handsome. Given these guys’ penchant for pleasing the crowd at all costs, I wonder what industry they would be in were they not in politics.
I think the Democrats saw how badly they failed in the 2001 election and decided to go down, what they saw as the TRT route with populist and nationalist policies. Unfortunately, for them they were 4 years too late.
As their latest successful pander on privatization shows, it’s never too late. What’s most sickening about all this is: the Democrats are still using “populist” as a general slur against the TRT, and the media Thai and international are still approvingly quoting them.
- 3
- JW 4.12.05
Why? It’s obviously not what he says, so the way he looks perhaps?
It is not what he says, but how he says it. I have just found Abhisit to be very articulate at least when he speaks in English. I have heard him being interviewed by the likes of the BBC and ABC (Australia) a few times. While I don’t always agree with what he says at least he is able to articulate what he says - I find this is a skill that Thaksin lacks sometimes particularly when he is speaking in English.
I have found that even when Thaksin is talking in Thai he is not the most polished speaker - I am primarily thinking of his weekly radio addresses.
Of course being articulate is not the be all and end all of being a politican, I still think it is an important factor. From what I have heard so far, Abhisit is more articulate than Thaksin.
Abhisit is also an improvement on Banyat, who to me didn’t appear to offer anything. This is probably another reason why I more partial to Abhisit.
- 4
- Fringer 5.12.05
I think that those who say the anti-Thaksin crowd has “no substance” to speak of should first understand the context and nature of Thailand’s oppressive politics and rampant corruptions at all levels. We are talking about a country where even institutions that are supposed to be ‘neutral’ can be bought (the infamous asset concealment case in 2001 that Thaksin barely scraped through, and whose bribes of the judges were brought to light in Prasong Sunsiri’s case is just one obvious example). And how many high-profile corrupt businessmen you know has ever been jailed?
In this kind of climate, whatever “substance” one has about high-level corruption isn’t easy to surface, let alone used effectively to bring the wrongdoers to justice.
Yes, the Thai press isn’t very smart. But that doesn’t mean everything they say is false. “Every lie has a kernel of truth,” as someone used to say. To conclude that Thaksin isn’t corrupt simply because one can’t find conclusive “evidence” or because the newspapers are confused is a very shallow way of drawing conclusions, I think.
As a Thai who’s worked in finance/banking here for the past 4 years and whose relatives and relatives’ friends have done so for dozens of years before me, I can guarantee you there IS a lot of substance to the anti-Thaksin opposition. Of course, it’s just my word. But talk to enough Thais, especially civil servants who work in Ministry of Finance, and financiers, and you will be able to gradually see how much “substance” we are talking about.
I suppose a lot of pro-Thaksin people would require “proof of corruption” in the form of a written “receipt” that Thaksin was famous for demanding, before they change their minds. Unfortunately, those who are smart enough to corrupt in this country are smart enough not to leave paper trails.
- 5
- Tom Vamvanij 5.12.05
Fringer:
You practically repeated what you’d said in our private correspondence, so forgive me if I, too, end up repeating myself despite my best effort not to.
the infamous asset concealment case in 2001 that Thaksin barely scraped through, and whose bribes of the judges were brought to light in Prasong Sunsiri’s case is just one obvious example
Constitutional court judges taking bribes? That is a very serious charge. Can you back up what you’re saying? Or will you just rely on the words of Khun Prasong, aka Mr. “Thailand’s CIA” (in which case you could at least link to him)? George Galloway sued the Daily Telegraph for that type of allegation and won £150,000. The same in Thailand would be called press intimidation.
And how many high-profile corrupt businessmen you know has ever been jailed?
Ekayuth Anchanbutr certainly escaped to the UK, didn’t he? Now he’s back as an anti-Thaksin crusader. Prachai Leophairatana is another high-profile (and connected?) example. Sondhi Limthongkul is set to join their ranks. Do you want these guys investigated and sentenced? Or do you see them as, in your words, “black cats” that you hope will catch Thaksin the mouse? That sounds remarkably like the “our bastards” doctrine to me.
Also, I forgot to mention this in our earlier exchange, the most famous stock manipulator when I’ve heard of, right up there with Sia Song, is “Mr. T” from a few years back. Needless to say, T not as in Thaksin.
Yes, the Thai press isn’t very smart. But that doesn’t mean everything they say is false. “Every lie has a kernel of truth,” as someone used to say. To conclude that Thaksin isn’t corrupt simply because one can’t find conclusive “evidence” or because the newspapers are confused is a very shallow way of drawing conclusions, I think.
Try finding your “kernel of truth” here. Your tautological justification of any statement is troubling, to say the least. What’s more, you’re touching upon an issue much dearer to me than the Thaksin government here. Politicians come and go; the media remains. In its present form, the Thai media doesn’t deserve to remain.
As a Thai who’s worked in finance/banking here for the past 4 years and whose relatives and relatives’ friends have done so for dozens of years before me, I can guarantee you there IS a lot of substance to the anti-Thaksin opposition. Of course, it’s just my word. But talk to enough Thais, especially civil servants who work in Ministry of Finance, and financiers, and you will be able to gradually see how much “substance” we are talking about.
Talk to enough people and they’ll tell you that the Thai media is full of crap. Or they may not. It hardly matters to me because I prove my case without appealing to anyone’s authority, including my own.
Note that I subject all information to a critical test, even when that works against what I’m trying to argue. (See my criticisms of The Nation’s coverage of Sondhi Limthongkul and the Postbag letter of Thailand’s alcohol consumption.)
I suppose a lot of pro-Thaksin people would require “proof of corruption” in the form of a written “receipt” that Thaksin was famous for demanding, before they change their minds. Unfortunately, those who are smart enough to corrupt in this country are smart enough not to leave paper trails.
When did Thaksin ever make such a demand? I know for a fact that the demand for “receipt” was famously made in Thai politics years before Thaksin entered it, probably during the Chatichai Government. I also remember (though less vividly) that Thaksin, in a clear reference to this demand, declared that a receipt is not needed in order for him to prosecute corrupt officials. I think his critics even invoked this pronouncement during Suriya’s no-confidence motion.
So go ahead, find me a source. Here’s your chance to prove what you said, for once.
- 6
- Fringer 5.12.05
As I already said in our e-mail exchanges, the fact that a lot of people are corrupt (yes, including Sondhi, and certainly Prachai) does NOT nullify the fact that Thaksin and a lot of his cabinet members are much more corrupt. I simply raised that question to show that in Thailand, corrupt businessmen (of whatever political conviction) generally DO get away with their crimes.
And yes, I know of the big stock manipulator “Mr. T.” But do you know that “Mr. S,” and “Mr. P,” two of TRT’s most active “money guys,” are even much bigger stock manipulators than Mr. T ever was? You should talk to more brokers.
So once again: saying that a lot of people before Thaksin are corrupt really isn’t that relevant to our discussion of whether or not THIS current government is corrupt.
About Constitution Court judges taking bribes, these are some “sources” that I could find in 5 minutes with Google. For someone who seems abreast of news, it’s a bit surprising that this is “new news” to you.
“คุณบัณฑิต ศิริพันธ์ ทนายความและพยานของจำเลยยังระบุด้วยว่า เคยคุยกับคุณอุระ หวังอ้อมกลาง ซึ่งเป็นตุลาการเสียงข้างน้อย เล่าให้ฟังว่า พ.ต.ท.ทักษิณ และนางเยาวภา วงศ์สวัสดิ์ ได้มาพบกับนายอุระ เพื่อขอให้ช่วยเหลือ โดย พ.ต.ท.ทักษิณกล่าวกับนายอุระว่า ขอคะแนน 1 เสียง แล้วลูกชายของนายอุระที่ทำงานอยู่กระทรวงการต่างประเทศจะย้ายไปเป็นเลขาทูตที่ประเทศไหนก็ได้ หรือจะลาออกจากราชการมาเป็น ส.ส.บัญชีรายชื่อพรรคไทยรักไทยก็ได้ ในขณะที่นางเยาวภาก็ไปพบนายอุระที่บ้านถึง 3 ครั้ง แต่นายอุระก็ไม่ได้ลงมติตามที่ถูกร้องขอ”
Sorry, I have to go do errands now. So anyhow: they offered bribes (okay, you might call it “favors”) to at least one judge, and this was on court records. If you want to know what they offered to other judges who DID vote to acquit Thaksin, we’ll probably have to meet or something ;)
And is the government doing anything with the well-known CTX scandal? Nada, even when it’s clear we still paid the same price for these machines even after we bought “direct” from the manufacturers.
I don’t deny that “source” of corruption in print format is rare (hey, that was my whole point in an earlier post - about how it is is Thailand). But hopefully in a few months at least a few corruption cases will be all but undeniable, thanks to Sondhi. I don’t like him any more than you do, but again, I’ll take any color cat at this point that can catch the (rotten) mouse.
- 7
- Tom Vamvanij 5.12.05
Fringer:
Thanks for the info. But the “source ” I requested in the penultimate sentence of my last comment was for your statement that “Thaksin was famous for demanding” a “receipt” of corruption.
Not that I don’t welcome information about alleged corruptions themselves, but you led me to believe earlier that you are not interested in going into the details.
Let me be clear here, I don’t think this government is corruption-free. However, I don’t think it’s worse in that regard than others before it, whereas it is far better in several other important ways, not least making all the right enemies. (Not you, Fringer, but Sondhi, Sanoh, Thirayuth, Sanitsuda, Gile, The Nation, etc.)
- 8
- JW 5.12.05
I think that those who say the anti-Thaksin crowd has “no substance” to speak of should first understand the context and nature of Thailand’s oppressive politics and rampant corruptions at all levels.
I don’t disagree with your statement about corruption being rampant at all levels, but I have seen nothing that suggests it wasn’t as rampant in 2000 when the Democrat led coalition were in power. There were also allegations of corruption then:
Asiaweek of 14 April 2000
The NCCC is mulling charges against another Democrat heavyweight, Transport Minister Suthep Thaugsuban. He may have to answer claims of involvement in alleged bidding irregularities for a $345-million fiber-optic network.
Asiaweek of 21 Jan 2000
Sanan, 64, has no degree, and performs woefully both in Parliament and his ministry. He has been implicated in a former coup attempt (and jailed for it), investigated for unexplained wealth, and most recently targeted for an alleged land scam [Sanan was of course found guilty]
I could go on and on. What happened to the Democrat led government in 1995, weren’t they brought down because of corruption found within the government?
A Democrat led government would hardly be free of corruption as well. Allegations of corruption by themselves don’t interest me that much, give me solid evidence and/or a conviction and I might take interest. There would be very few politicans left in Thailand if they had to resign because of allegations of corruption. I am not saying I like this but it is a fact to accept.
I am sorry I am with Tom on this one. There are plenty of things to criticise Thaksin about - ie the Deep South which I see raise on your website.
- 9
- Fringer 5.12.05
Tom: Oops, my bad. I misremembered the Thaksin quote but in effect what he said was not much better. For instance:
http://www.asiamediaforum.org/node/117
“The PM doesn’t see the crusading press as a partner in clipping the wings of the corrupt elements fluttering around his power base. Officially, he says he is still very much in anti-corruption mode. Once he declared that he didn’t need a “receipt” to punish palm-greasing within his government. Now, he has resorted to the age-old cliches: “Corruption is deep-rooted. I need time. I need evidence. I need to be fair to all parties concerned.” “
Different words, same empty meaning.
JW: I can definitely tell you that this government is far more corrupt than the previous one. It’s much smarter at both concealing corruptions, and passing laws that legalize those corruptions (hence the term “corruption by policy” in Thai becoming reality) because it controls both houses.
Ask any contractor in the construction business, for example, and he/she will tell you about how the “kickback” percentage under this government is now about 25-30% (whereas in previous governments it was more like 20%), plus the government finds all sorts of new ways to corrupt (for example, by hiring “financial advisors” to evaluate “feasibility studies” of projects far before detailed feasibility studies are done, to get kickbacks as soon as the cabinet “approves in principle” of the projects - so politicians no longer need to wait 5-6 months for detailed studies to be finished before they can skim off the top.
Sondhi talks a little bit about this too, and this kind of “facts from insiders” is the MAIN reason people should listen to him every week (not his “power to the king” propaganda, which I completely disagree with). The man gets a lot of information nowadays.
The main reason high-level corruptions in this government are not easily seen (nor understood) by the public is that the corrupted guys are really much smarter than the Democrats. Remember we are talking about a lot of successful businessmen-turned-politicians here. If you are not familiar with finance or don’t work in finance/banking, it’s not likely for you to “see” these corruptions take place.
Anyway, just keep listening to Sondhi, focus on the “facts” not “fad,” notice how the government tries to change the subject (or stays silent completely) in face of each allegation, and you might be convinced of how much “worse” Thaksin is in a few months. The simple fact that the government is doing nothing about infamous corruption cases that have already been publicly established as facts (CTX scandal, for instance) should already tell you of their intentions.
- 10
- Fringer 5.12.05
JW: I’d love to “show” you the evidence, but unfortunately for reasons I already said in my earlier comment, evidence of corruption is very hard to surface. I can only vouch (with… I don’t know, my personal honor?) that, via first-hand information or a lot of second-hand information from friends involved in the deals, the following issues that involved corruptions (outright, or “corruptions by policy”) by Thaksin and/or his affiliates did indeed take place:
(and I’m not even mentioning “other” problems with this government, like the South, abuses of power, etc. etc. These are just scandals that are well-known in financial circles. You can probably find some information in English if you search hard enough; I know quite a few Thai papers reported on these)
- Natural Park scandal (involving KTB that ended with K. Viroj ousted from KTB and Finansa failing to get banking license from BOT. Basically Finansa structured the deal so that KTB lent more loans to the company, voted to reduce shareholders’ equity to minimal amount, then sells it to a new group of shareholders. One of those who benefited from this blatant “raid on government bank’s coffers” is a certain first lady).
- Amendment of ThaiCom concession & tax benefits from government
- Amendment of ITV concession & terms
- Share manipulation (and investor scams) of PICNIC and EWC
- Burma loans from EXIM Bank (and related satellite sale)
- Hostile acquisition of Phayathai Hospital by Vichai Tongtaeng (Thaksin’s lawyer in share concealment case)
- Koh Chang development plans & land sales
- Alpine golf course
- CTX scandal
- Longan subsidy scandal
- Kong Daan scandal
- AirAsia establishment and subsequent transfer of a few profitable routes from Thai Airways
- Thaksin’s son’s company getting Bt 5bn loans from ICT Ministry, interest-free, with BOI privileges to boot for his amusement park project (and BOI granting privileges to a non-industrial company is unheard of)
- Thaksin’s son’s company being ‘awarded’ all advertising for underground train (after the “real” winners have already won, and their contract taken out of their hands so to speak).These are just off the top of my head. They should occupy you for some time, though, if you want to search for more information :)
We’re not even talking about future disasters, hidden dangers that are waiting to happen once the cost of this government’s populist policies surfaces in a few years. My friend in MOF said the government purposefully reschedules the final repayment date of many loans to coincide with the end of their second term (and their “trick” of hiding liabilities as off-balance sheet items like funds is now well-known). I’m sure quite a few economists have already raised warning flags.
- 11
- JW 6.12.05
I don’t dispute this is corruption within the government. While, I am not saying I disbelieve you, I don’t necessarily see all the scandals you list as being “corruption by Thaksin and the government”, maybe a conflict of interest and officials deferring too much. Not that this doesn’t concern me, but there were plenty of bad things to go on during the Democrats time in government.
Hearsay evidence doesn’t stand up in court and there is a good reason for that.
I’m sure quite a few economists have already raised warning flags.
I do have some concerns over the use of Keynesian style economics, which is part of the so-called Thaksinomics, but after the Asian Crisis I do think it was necessary and am generally persuaded by Daniel Lian’s arguments.
- 12
- Fringer 6.12.05
Daniel Lian is definitely one of the most active and optimistic “cheerleaders” of Thaksinomics, and for good reason: his firm MSDW is very close to this government (and particularly Mr. Pansak), and since Thaksin came into power has won numerous deals for which they were paid a lot of money in return for having done almost no ‘real’ work (this comes straight from colleagues and friends who worked directly with MSDW investment bankers on Thai deals). That’s not to mention MSDW helping you-know-who in the government set up nominee companies offshore (e.g. Singapore) as vehicles for share manipulation.
I’m not saying Lian’s analysis of Thaksinomics is 100% wrong. It’s just biased quite a bit by his firm’s very tight connections with Thaksin.
And I hope you have seen a certain extremely unprofessional (and quite obseqious) letter from Daniel Lian, addressed to Thaksin recently. See for example:
http://www.feer.com/tales/?postid=176
If you have never seen this letter, I’d be more than happy to upload the scan so you can read it yourself (and yes, I have it on good authority from MOF friends who have seen this fax, that the letter is real.)
- 13
- Tom Vamvanij 7.12.05
Fringer:
Please don’t go down the ad hominem path. Things can get ugly very quickly.
You are writing under pseudonym, so one can’t dig up dirt about your employer and personal connections. Or can one? I don’t do that sort of stuff anyway, but others, inspired by your example, may be tempted to.
Alternatively, one may question your economic judgement by pointing to your glowing endorsement of Bhutan’s “gross national happiness” (with Buddhist references thrown in). Indeed, this may not be ad hominem at all, given that we are talking about economics and one can’t respond to your arguments when you’re not making any.
Mr. Lien made his arguments. You could’ve rebutted them but you chose not to.
Perhaps that’s understandable. Judging from Thailand’s economic performances from 2002 to 2004, his bullishness at the end of 2001 would appear to have been more in the right than, say, Kasikorn Research Center’s bearishness.
Speaking of KRC, does this memo look professional to you? Obviously no conflict of interest there.
PS In the interest of reasoned discussion, I’ll skip snides about FEER.
- 14
- Fringer 7.12.05
Well, I’m sorry doing a bit of “ad hominem” thingy. I just thought Mr. Lian’s letter is one good (and quite rare) “written evidence” of how closely connected his firm is to the government. It is a well-known fact that his reports often “cheer” Thaksinomics far more than it deserves (and far more than most other investment banking houses), neglecting to mention “hidden costs” (for example, rescheduled loans and off-balance sheet liabilities I mentioned briefly) that the government is sure to be accountable for in only a few years.
So I just wanted to say that: his own personal connections with Mr. Pansak and the fact that his firm is making a ton of money in Thailand may explain why his research reports are the most unreservedly bullish about Thaksinomics.
Nobody can dispute that Thaksin’s policies did a lot of “right” things in terms of spurring economic growth, especially jumpstarting the economy with consumption.
But I thought we’re discussing his government’s corruptions, not the effects of his economic policies. They are very different issues, right? Large-scale corruptions, particularly corruption-by-policy, are to me more important than the fact that our economy is growing at 5.5% rather than 4.5%, etc.
Khun JW said he thinks the Democrats are no less corrupt, and I’ve been trying to say (not successfully, it seems :)) that this government’s corruptions are far worse and more grievous, not least because they corrupt by policy, i.e. passing laws or changing rules to benefit a handful of companies.
In the long list of examples I gave Khun JW, even if a handful were “proven” to actually take place, it would be enough to unseat this government. Once again, the fact that we know for a fact that one corruption (CTX) did take place, and the fact that the government chose not to persecute the culprits further (I guess they don’t “have to” anymore, since Khunying Jaruwan still can’t get into her office), should be enough to tell even the most ardent supporter of Thaksin that there is “something fishy” going on. And shouldn’t we, the public, want the culprits punished?
Truthfully, I never really read Kasikorn Research Center’s reports. For economics, I usually just read reports on Thailand published by local houses, like Phatra, and a few foreign firms, like UBS and Goldman Sachs. So I have no idea how good KRC is. I doubt the quality is as good as these investment banks’ research though.
Also, I don’t see what’s wrong with Bhutan’ GDH approach. I really don’t. A lot of economists are paying a lot of attention on “the economics of happiness” now because money can’t guarantee happiness. What Bhutan is trying to do - modernize without losing their spiritual endowment and environmental harmony - isn’t really so different from “economics of sustainability” that our King often suggests but no politician takes to action.
Oh well. It IS interesting to hear differing views, and I’m glad you have the patience to argue with me :) I’m afraid our views are far too different, though, that it is unlikely we can ‘persuade’ each other to change our minds. I can only hope that, in a few months, enough facts will surface to convince you that this government is the most corrupt one in our country’s short history.
- 15
- Fringer 7.12.05
Whoops, meant to say “our democracy’s short history” in the last sentence, sorry about that.
- 16
- post staffer 7.12.05
Despite what you say above, Fringer, it seems to me that if you can find a smear against someone, then you will use it.
I suspect you long ago abandoned reason or logical argument. You’ll resort to a politician’s grab-bag of dirty tricks to attack anyone who happens not to agree with your views.
This government is more corrupt than any other in this country’s history?
Well, evidently the investors and analysts you keep citing do not agree with you, or the economic fundamentals which you admit look so good would be in a mess.I see from your blog that you are a Sonthi fan. Like many Sonthi fans, I suspect, you don’t need proof. Your mind is made up.
Aware that Sonthi is a flawed hero, you have been careful to qualify your support:
ตราบใดที่สนธิยังนำความจริงเหล่านี้มาเปิดโปงให้ประชาชนรับทราบ ในห้วงเวลาที่รัฐบาลพยายาม “ปิดปากสื่อ” แบบเบ็ดเสร็จตลอดเวลาแล้ว ทุกคนก็ควรมองว่า สนธิกำลังทำคุณประโยชน์ให้กับประเทศชาติมากกว่าโทษ
…ไม่ว่าสนธิจะมี “ผลประโยชน์” เกี่ยวข้องอะไรในการออกมาโจมตีรัฐบาลในครั้งนี้
…ไม่ว่าจะมีกี่คนที่ชอบฟังสนธิเพียงเพราะอยาก “ตามกระแส” หรือ “เอามันส์”
…ไม่ว่าจำนวนคนที่ไปฟังสนธิพูด จะมีกี่หมื่นหรือกี่แสนคน เป็นกี่เปอร์เซ็นต์ของ 19 ล้านเสียง ที่เลือกไทยรักไทยกลับมาเป็นรัฐบาล
…ไม่ว่าการปะทะกันในครั้งนี้ จะทำให้ 19 ล้านเสียงนั้นหายไปแล้วกี่เสียง
…ไม่ว่าการกระทำของสนธิ จะเข้าข่าย “ปลุกระดม” หรือไม่ (ไม่ว่าจะเรียกว่าปลุกระดมหรือไม่ ก็สำคัญน้อยกว่าคำถามที่ว่า พฤติกรรมของรัฐบาลที่สนธิมาแฉนั้น “สมควร” ที่จะทำให้ประชาชนโกรธหรือเปล่า)
…และไม่ว่าการปลุกกระแส “ถวายคืนพระราชอำนาจ” ของสนธิในครั้งนี้ จะเป็นวิธีการที่ดีหรือไม่ เพียงใด (โดยส่วนตัว ผู้เขียนไม่เห็นด้วยกับวิธีการนี้อย่างยิ่ง เพราะเป็นการสนับสนุนให้ระบอบประชาธิปไตยของเราเดิน “ถอยหลังเข้าคลอง” คือแทนที่จะเน้นการกระตุ้น และสร้างช่องทางให้ประชาชนมีความรู้ ความตื่นตัว และส่วนร่วมทางการเมืองมากขึ้น กลับมุ่งเน้นการพึ่ง “เบื้องสูง” เวลามีปัญหาเฉพาะหน้า)ประเด็นเหล่านี้ล้วนเป็นประเด็นรองทั้งสิ้น
ประเด็นที่สำคัญที่สุดคือ รัฐบาลยังไม่สามารถ “ตอบคำถาม” ของสนธิในประเด็นต่างๆ ที่เกี่ยวกับพฤติกรรมการคอรัปชั่น และเอื้อผลประโยชน์ให้พวกพ้อง ได้อย่างชัดเจน มีเหตุผล และน่าเชื่อถือ
Why does this all sound so familiar? It’s office worker talk, the kind of fashionable and unsubstantiated gossip your disparage in your second qualifier above.
The government was wrong to try to shut him down; I think we all acknowledge that. It could have put up a more vigorous attempt to explain its actions.
But that does not mean it has been sitting idle. Nor can you claim that no action has been taken in relation to the list of ‘scandals’ you put up earlier. A glance at your local newspaper, for example, will tell you that a court case us about to begin in relation to the Klong Dan case.
But I do like the point you make about Sonthi’s populist call to bring back the King’s powers. I see he wants to re-write the constitution to this effect, too. But does the public really want to go down that path? I doubt it.
Safeguarding the institution of monarchy is the ultimate goal of Sonthi’s campaign - or was, until the King cut the ground from under him with his remarks welcoming criticism.
Now he is left with…what, exactly? One tawdry ‘scandal’ after another, which he will roll out at his weekly gatherings, so long as he has obliging public servants leaking him supposed evidence, and office workers willing to talk it up.
If he is no longer able to play the monarchy card, seems Sonthi will turn into just another anti-corruption crusader. Plenty of them around, and they all seem to come from Bangkok. Not enough to unseat a government. If that is what he wants, he’s likely to fail.
Speaking of which, I can’t agree with you on this:
ไม่ว่าการกระทำของสนธิ จะเข้าข่าย “ปลุกระดม” หรือไม่ (ไม่ว่าจะเรียกว่าปลุกระดมหรือไม่ ก็สำคัญน้อยกว่าคำถามที่ว่า พฤติกรรมของรัฐบาลที่สนธิมาแฉนั้น “สมควร” ที่จะทำให้ประชาชนโกรธหรือเปล่า)
Under the law of any democracy, that’s sedition. He has no right to incite or encourage people to unseat an elected government. If he should be charged with anything, it’s that. At the end of his last show, he urged his followers to rise up.
If I had been head of the police, I would have arrested him then.
Your list of qualifiers goes on…
รัฐบาลไม่สามารถตอบคำถามเหล่านี้ได้ เพราะคำถามเหล่านี้เป็นความจริงที่ไม่มีใครสามารถปฏิเสธ
ก็เลยต้องพยายาม “เบี่ยงประเด็น” ด้วยการอ้างถึงความชอบธรรมของตัวเอง ว่ามีประชาชนสนับสนุนมากมายมหาศาลกว่าจำนวนคนที่ไปสวนลุมฯ รายสัปดาห์
ทั้งๆ ที่นี่เป็นการใช้เหตุผลแบบน่าหัวร่อ เพราะความจริงย่อมไม่มีวันตาย ถึงมีคนไปฟังสนธิแค่หยิบมือเดียว ก็ไม่ได้แปลว่าข้อมูลที่สนธินำมาแฉนั้น ไม่เป็นความจริง
แม้สิ่งที่สนธิกล่าวหารัฐบาลเป็นจริงแค่หนึ่งในสิบ รัฐบาลนี้ก็สมควรลาออกแล้ว เพราะแต่ละอย่างที่กล่าวหานั้น เป็นเรื่องใหญ่ระดับชาติทั้งนั้นOne tenth? This is all so lame, it does not warrant a response.
We also get this:
ยิ่งรัฐบาลพยายามเบี่ยงประเด็นเท่าไหร่ ประชาชนคนธรรมดาอย่างเราก็ยิ่งต้องตั้งสติ ใช้วิจารณญาณไตร่ตรองข้อมูลให้มาก เพราะพฤติกรรม “โหนกระแส” ของหลายๆ คนที่ไปฟังสนธิเพราะความมันส์ ความสะใจ เหมือนไปดูคอนเสิร์ต ตลอดจนกระแส “พระราชอำนาจ” ที่กำลังมาแรง (ทั้งๆ ที่ไม่ได้เป็นเรื่องคอขาดบาดตายเท่ากับการคอรัปชั่นระดับชาติ) ทำให้เราแยกแยะระหว่าง “อารมณ์” และ “เหตุผล” ระหว่าง “คนพูด” และ “สิ่งที่พูด” และระหว่าง “กระแส” และ “ความจริง” ได้ยากยิ่งขึ้นไปอีก.
I don’t think the government needs to evade the issue, and hopefully it will now show more enthusiasm about responding to his claims. Then we will really see how credible Sonthi is.
Sounds like you are distancing yourself from Sonthi’s mob, if not Sonthi’s message. Yet he is nothing without his band of admirers … he has no electoral legitimacy, no platform. He is what his supporters have created, and nothing more.
What does Sonthi really want? Attention and flattery.
[Sondhi’s] lawyer said his client was not hoping for his talk show to return to Channel 9, but would be pleased if MCOT Plc board members Thongthong Chandrangsu, Rawat Chamchalerm and Mingkwan Saengsuwan apologised to him.
How sad. He seems as vain as the politicians he is so keen to attack.
Is this the fearless crusader for truth and free speech you’re so keen to champion?
- 17
- post staffer 7.12.05
I have been reading responses left by readers at Fringer’s blog. I like the first one, about how freedom (Sonthi’s right to criticise, for example) must be balanced by responsibility. Politicians are elected and can be held to account for their actions and utterances; Sonthi is not. Here is what the poster says:
สิทธิในระบอบประชาธิปไตยต้องมาคู่กันกับ หน้าที่ และความรับผิดชอบ อันนี้หมายถึงว่าแม้ว่าเราจะมีสิทธิ ถึงจะเป็นเรื่องส่วนตัวแค่ไหน เราก็ไม่ได้มีแบบไร้ขอบเขต มันจะต้องมาคู่กับความรับผิดชอบเสมอ นั่นคือ เราอยากทำอะไรก็ได้ เรามีสิทธิที่จะทำตราบใดที่สิ่งนั้นไม่ได้ทำให้คนอื่นเดือดร้อน, rights ต้องใช้คู่กันกับ obligation เช่นเดียวกับที่ freedom ต้องคู่กับ equality
ทีนี้ในส่วนของข้อเท็จจริงหรือสัจธรรมนี้ ก็ยังเป็นเรื่องที่ต้องถกเถียงกันอยู่ว่ามันมีอยู่จริงหรือไม่ ถ้ามีจริง เราจะรู้ได้อย่างไรว่านี่คือความจริง ไม่ใช่แค่ความเชื่อ ซึ่งตอนนี้ก็ยังหาข้อสรุปไม่ได้แน่นอน (แม้แต่วิทยาศาสตร์)
ความเคลือบแคลงในเรื่องความจริงนี้ ทำให้เราคิดว่า การเอาความจริงมาเป็นข้ออ้างในการที่จะใช้สิทธิโดยปราศจากขอบเขต ปราศจากหน้าที่ และความรับผิดชอบ หรือ การที่จะทำให้คนอื่นเดือดร้อน โดยอ้างว่า ‘เราสู้เพื่อความจริง’ นี้เป็นเรื่องอันตรายและควรต้องระมัดระวังเป็นพิเศษ
เมื่อเรายังไม่รู้จัก ‘ความจริง’ ดีพอ จะมีสิทธิอันใดไปสู้เพื่อมัน
ทั้งนี้ทั้งนั้น ไม่ได้มาเถียงแทนทักสินนะคะ (เราอยู่ฝ่ายเดียวกัน ฮ่าๆ) แต่มาตั้งคำถามในเชิงปรัชญาเฉยๆค่า
Your response, Fringer? As loaded as the stuff you left above. Seems you just can’t give a straight answer, so prejudiced are you against the government:
เห็นด้วยอย่างยิ่งเลยค่ะ ในเรื่องของความรับผิดชอบต่อสิ่งที่เราพูดนี้ กฎหมายก็กำหนดอย่างนั้นอยู่ เพราะเราต้อง “เตรียมใจ” ที่จะถูกฟ้องร้องด้วย เวลาเราอ้างว่าอะไรคือความจริง ซึ่งทักษิณก็ได้ทำไปแล้วหลายหน
Oh, for goodness sake!
However, you do go on to say:สนธิก็กำลังแสดง “ความรับผิดชอบ” มากกว่ารัฐบาลเยอะ เพราะอย่างน้อยก็ใช้เหตุผล และข้อมูลมาสนับสนุนข้อกล่าวหาต่างๆ ไม่ใช่เบี่ยงประเด็นไปไหนไม่รู้
Sometimes the government can mess up its response to allegations through a simple lack of coordination (see Bangkok Pundit’s post on the C-130 saga), rather than a deliberate attempt to obfuscate.
The following response from you is more realistic:
ต้องบอกว่า “ไม่เคยชอบ” สนธิเลย เพราะเคยเข้าข้างรัฐบาลแบบน่าเกลียดมาก่อน ตอนนี้ก็ยังไม่ชอบอยู่ แต่เชื่อว่า “แมวขาวหรือแมวดำก็ไม่สำคัญ ขอให้มันจับหนูได้ก็พอ” ตามที่เติ้งเสี่ยวผิงพูดค่ะ ในภาวะที่นักการเมืองโกงกันสะบั้นหั่นแหลกขนาดนี้ แม้ว่าสนธิจะไม่ใช่ผู้นำในอุดมคติก็ตาม การที่เขาออกมา “แฉ” ความจริงหลายๆ อย่าง (ซึ่งเป็นเพียงกระผีกเดียว ของสิ่งที่รัฐบาลนี้ทำ) เขาก็สมควรพูดต่อไป ถ้าหากเกิดการ “ประนีประนอม” ขึ้นจริงระหว่างทั้งสองฝ่าย ก็ไม่ได้แปลว่าสิ่งที่สนธิพูดมาทั้งหมดนั้น เป็นความเืท็จ เรา (ประชาชน) ควรกดดันให้รัฐบาลต้องรับผิดชอบเรื่องเหล่านี้
จากข้อมูลที่รับทราบมา ทั้งทางตรงและทางอ้อม และที่ประสบกับตัวเอง (เช่น เวลาไปประชุมกับผู้บริหารของกลุ่มชินวัตร) ตลอดเวลาสี่ปีที่ผ่านมา การันตีไ้ด้เลยค่ะว่า ระหว่างสนธิกับทัีกษิณตอนนี้ สนธิกำลัง “โกหกหลอกลวง” ประชาชน น้อยกว่ารัฐบาลนี้หลายเท่า
อย่างที่บอกในบทความนะคะ ไ่ม่ว่าสนธิจะมีเหตูจูงใจอะไร เป็นคนไม่ีดีอย่างไร ใช้วิธีการผิดยังไง ใช้ “ธง” อะไรในการดึงดูดความสนใจของคนให้มาฟังเยอะๆ ความจริงก็คือความจริงอยู่วันยังค่ำ ไม่อยากให้คนไปฟังสนธิด้วยความ “ศรัทธา” เลยค่ะ เพราะศรัทธาย่อมไม่สำคัญเท่ากับความจริง และเปลี่ยนแปรได้ง่ายตามอารมณ์ กระแส ฯลฯ อยากให้ทุกคนไปฟังสนธิเพื่อเอา “ข้อมูล” มาไตร่ตรองดูมากกว่า ว่ารัฐบาลนี้เลวจริงหรือไม่ เพราะหลายๆ อย่างที่สนธิพูด เราไม่มีทางได้ยินได้ฟังจากรัฐบาล และสื่อกระแสหลักต่างๆ (เช่น ทีวีทุกช่อง) เพราะถูก “คุม” อย่างเบ็ดเสร็จไปนานแล้ว
So, such is the government’s stranglehold over the media and desire to suppress all dissent that we have to rely on Sonthi alone to give us the truth? Oh, come on!
As I read further into your blog, you leave so many qualifiers, cavils and reservations about poor Sonthi that I would be surprised if anyone reading your blog would bother tuning into his show any more. He’s like Batman without his cape.
You are more interested in hearing what scandals Sonthi has to dish up - the lurid allegations of corruption and nepotism that you are so convinced exist - than you are worried about how tarnished Sonthi’s reputation has become.
For as long as the government failed to counter his claims, then those allegations could go on simmering, and exist independently, apparently, of whether the person making them (Sonthi) should be trusted.
Well, hopefully if this government can get its act together, you will now get all the facts you say you need to make a logical and reasoned assessment of this government’s merits.
Think you’re still up to that?
- 18
- Fringer 7.12.05
Khun post staffer: I’m not sure exactly how to respond to your comments regarding my post, since most of them are based on your assumption (or conviction) that a lot of his claims are untrue. But I agree 100% with your following opinion though:
“If he is no longer able to play the monarchy card, seems Sonthi will turn into just another anti-corruption crusader. Plenty of them around, and they all seem to come from Bangkok. Not enough to unseat a government. If that is what he wants, he’s likely to fail.”
I do believe the government’s corruptions are onerous enough to unseat them, if enough truths come to light.
You are right that I am “more interested in hearing what scandals Sonthi has to dish up - the lurid allegations of corruption and nepotism that you are so convinced exist” than I am “…worried about how tarnished Sonthi’s reputation has become.” Mainly that’s because Sondhi NEVER really has any “reputation” to speak of, in my mind - I dislike him ever since he was overtly siding with Thaksin consistently for the past few years until recently.
I agree it’s time we “wait and see” if this government can really “get its act together” and show enough convincing evidence that shows how Sondhi’s claims are false. I am eager to see it.
Thanks for reading my blog though :)
- 19
- poststaffer 7.12.05
I’m not sure exactly how to respond to your comments regarding my post, since most of them are based on your assumption (or conviction) that a lot of his claims are untrue.
Not necessarily. But we know where you stand, don’t we?
ประเด็นที่สำคัญที่สุดคือ รัฐบาลยังไม่สามารถ “ตอบคำถาม” ของสนธิในประเด็นต่างๆ ที่เกี่ยวกับพฤติกรรมการคอรัปชั่น และเอื้อผลประโยชน์ให้พวกพ้อง ได้อย่างชัดเจน มีเหตุผล และน่าเชื่อถือ
The government has yet to give a clear or credible response to Sonthi’s allegations - what, all of them?
The government responded to his allegation that one of Thaksin’s sisters was given improper access to an air force C-130; it also answered his claim that Thaksin did not get permission for his merit-making ceremony at the Temple of the Emerald Buddha.
Those explanations evidently failed to satisfy you. And yet you say you are able to distinguish between emotion and fact; gossip and substance.
Not according to my reading, you’re not.
- 20
- Fringer 8.12.05
Frankly, I don’t think the brouhaha over C-130 and Temple use is the kind of “important corruption info” that Sondhi should focus on. They are extremely minor issues compared to the kind of corruption I want Sondhi to talk about. But I understand he may not have “hard evidence” for all of his allegations, and his “we’ll fight for the king” approach (which I strongly disagree with) sort of forces him to pay more attention to royalty-related events like this Temple scandal, even though they are really more like nitpicks in my opinion.
So no, in my article I’m not thinking about that kind of allegations. I’m thinking more about large-scale corruption cases, like corruptions relating to a construction company run by Thaksin’s sister (who used to be in the business of selling silk in a Sukhumvit soi until her brother became PM) which Sondhi talked about last time, Suvarnabhumi airport, etc. etc.
Let’s wait and see ;)
- 21
- post staffer 8.12.05
Today’s Bangkok Post led with a story alleging that government ‘rent-seeking’ policies were enriching ministers and their business cronies.
The claims were made by Pasuk Phongpaichit, of Chulalongkorn University’s political economy study centre.
By coincidence, on the internet today I stumbled upon another paper the same author, which goes into more detail about the ‘rent-seeking’ theory, drawing on the work of economist Mushtaq Khan.
The paper is well worth a read, even if you don’t like some of its conclusions, or how the author reaches them.
Khan’s idea, summarised very quickly and crudely, is as follows. Those holding political and administrative power have the ability to create what are called “rents”, particularly in the form of abnormally high levels of business profit. They can do this in many ways: by creating monopolies; by providing protection against foreign competition; by sheltering illegal businesses; and so on.
Another simple formula may help push the analysis a bit further:
V = A + B - K.
Here V is the total rent or final net corruption revenue. It is made up of two sorts of income, A and B, less the costs incurred, K.
Of the income, A is a kind of “corruption tax”, which politicians and bureaucrats collect by taking petty commission fees, padding expenditure budgets, skimming expenses, and so on. This is simple theft, and very familiar.
The second type, B, is more complex. This is the corruption or “rent” which politicians and their friends earn from businesses that are able to charge high prices through creation of a favourable political environment. Some of these are illegal businesses. Some are businesses which have been granted monopolies. Some are just businesses which have been given privileged or favourable treatment.
K represents the costs of rent-seeking or corruption. Net corruption income equals, roughly speaking, commission fees plus monopoly profits less costs. Once in power, political parties will try to maximise their corruption revenue by increasing the amount of A and B. They will also do several things to ensure that K is minimised.
They will try to control the judiciary and suppress sources of opposition such as the media, opposition parties, and activist elements in civil society, as well as trying to redefine how corruption is perceived.
The paper talks about the rise of Thaksin, within this theoretical framework. It describes his policies as ‘pseudo-populist’, where populist policies are viewed as a sop to the populace (mainly farmers), or a means to deflect the potential cost of K.
Thaksin’s rapid success came from two things. First, he secured four telecoms concessions which gave him monopoly or oligopoly rights - in particular, the first Thai mobile phone concession and the first Thai communications satellite. Second, he raised money on the Thai stock market, which was on a rise from 200 in 1986 to 1750 at its peak.
From the start, Thaksin’s triumph was dependent on politics. He got his four telecoms concessions at a time when military influence was strong. He had to lobby generals to get them, and he had to reward them. In one famous instance, he gave a general a Daimler. At the launch of his communications satellite, he said “I could not have this day without Big Jod,” the nickname of General Sunthorn Kongsompong, the head of a junta which briefly took control of the country in a coup in 1991. On the other hand, he lost some contests (especially a three-million-line telephone contract in 1991) because rivals had better political connections at the right time.
In 1992, the army lost influence, and politicians began to enjoy more control over concession awards. In 1994, Thaksin entered politics, choosing the party which controlled the communications ministry. He immediately used his position to angle for another telecom contract and also expanded into highway concessions.
But in 1995-6, Thaksin lost his influence over the ministry of transport and communications. A competitor got a new telephone line contract. Another got a second mobile phone concession, undermining Thaksin’s monopoly. The military began making plans to put up a satellite to compete against Thaksin’s. The government signed the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreement to liberalise telecommunications and other services by 2006.
Clearly, the future success of Thaksin’s business depended crucially on political decisions: who would get what concession; who would be in the right position to manage telecom market liberalisation in 2006. He needed political power for commercial survival.
When the financial crisis struck in 1997, Thaksin and his rivals in the telecom industry reacted very quickly. They realised that in the new, tougher circumstances, they had the option of either fighting one another to the death or pooling resources for survival. They chose the latter. Thaksin and his biggest competitor, Charoen Pokphand (CP), Thailand’s biggest conglomerate, merged their cable TV networks and agreed to co-operate in other areas. In 1998, Thaksin re-entered politics, started a new party, Thai Rak Thai, and launched his bid for the premiership. CP became one of his biggest backers. By the time Thaksin became prime minister in February 2001, all four of the big Thai telecom companies were represented in his party and in the Cabinet. He was endorsed by the Bangkok Bank, Thailand’s largest, and his Thai Rak Thai party was studded with other big business families which had survived (or even profited from) the 1997 economic crisis.
The paper says Thaksin has tried to move from a ‘’scrappy, unregulated market for political favours of all kinds’’ in favour of a more discrete and regulated one, which he can control through a dominant majority party.
As part of this project, he will have to clean up the petty, furtive, A-type corruption if only because, in the recent past, this corruption has created an atmosphere of scandal in which governments have been driven out of power. However, going over to [a more stable] system of rent-seeking may mean dissipating rents to other political clients to buy their acquiescence. This has already happened through Thaksin’s so-called “populist” programmes to gain the electoral support of the rural mass, whose demands have become increasingly difficult to ignore.
Too cynical? Elsewhere the paper concedes that Thaksin ‘’has shaken up the political system and perhaps begun to re-write the social contract’’.
Thaksin’s pseudo-populist moves and other reforms have disrupted some established habits, confronted vested interests, and broken some rice-bowls. Those affected include powerful bureaucrats and old-style politicians, including many inside Thaksin’s own party.
The likely result?
Much depends on how other parties and political forces react to Thaksin’s rise. If they react by copying Thaksin’s model of a big business coalition, then Thai politics and Thai corruption may move towards a US model. If, on the other hand, they recognise the popular support which Thaksin mobilised, but give it better institutional form as a mass party, Thai politics will move in another direction.
- 22
- post staffer 8.12.05
Finally, the paper talks about a political and linguistic discourse on the term ”good governance”, which the World Bank had brought into vogue, but which politicians and academics had trouble intepreting in the Thai language.
Even by the left-leaning standards of this paper, poor Thirayudh Boonmee emerges looking quite loopy. I’ve edited it slightly for length.
Like many other modern or recently-invented political words, the term “governance” proved difficult to translate when it was tossed into Thai social debates in the late 1990s, largely as a result of the World Bank’s use of the term.
The first stab at interpretation produced thammarat, an assemblage of thamma (dharma), the Buddhist term for truth or virtue, and rat, a word for rule or state. This was challenged on the ground that it could easily be misinterpreted as meaning something like a “holy state”.
One suggested alternative was thammapiban, with the second part now a word meaning administration. However, this form appears clumsy and smacks of officialese. Besides, some also felt that the usage of thamma gave the new term too strong a Buddhistic connotation.
Finally, others felt that both these efforts relied wholly on Sanskritic (rather than Thai) words and hence belonged to old bureaucratic high culture.
In 1998, while these linguistic squabbles were going on, a group led by Anand Panyarachun, a career technocrat and ex-premier, and Thirayudh Boonmee, a veteran ex-student leader and prominent social critic, began to educate people about “governance” through speeches, radio broadcasts, seminars and so forth. From this process emerged two very different interpretations of “governance” or thammarat/ thammapiban.
For one group, championed by Anand, governance was interpreted in a way close to its new conventional international meaning: as meaning greater efficiency in government and business through better information, improved transparency and accountability, and more attention to rule-based systems and laws. In other words, it meant a further step on the road towards modernity, especially through a resuscitation and renovation of the state.
[However] meetings of NGOs, activists and local groups called by Thirayudh to discuss thammarat came up with a different meaning, as a result of their distrust of state-based culture.
This culture, in their view, has helped construct forms of domination which are themselves a problem for governance. They argued, for example, that the state’s adoption of the colonial-era myth identifying a nation with an ethnic group (thus turning Siam into Thai-land), has resulted in “non-Thai” groups - Lao, Chinese, Malay, Karen, Hmong and so forth - being treated as less than full members of the nation.
They noted that state policies have resulted in the capital, Bangkok, becoming oppressively dominant economically and culturally. They suggested that the influence of the court, the aristocracy, the Chinese, the Americans and the Japanese have increased male dominance in the family, politics and administration.
And they pointed out that elites’ enthusiasms for “modernity” [including] the belief that foreign investment was Thailand’s opportunity to become a fully qualified, urbanised member of the modern world have been prejudicial to many ordinary people.
People who find themselves at the “wrong” end of these axes opposing “Thai” to “non-Thai”, city to village or forest, men to women and “modernity” to “tradition”, the critics charged, have often suffered from forms of civil disability, political disenfranchisement, social exclusion and cultural suppression.
Examples include women in hill communities, ethnic minorities, forest gatherers, and the poor living on the fringe of degraded forests that city dwellers would like to claim as sites for hydroelectric dams, waste-disposal systems, factories, or leisure facilities and national parks.
Accordingly, activist critics claimed, “good governance” ought to mean expanding civil society at the expense of the state. They advocated decentralisation and increased autonomy of local communities and administration, especially in the management of local natural resources.
They wanted to keep more surplus produce within rural communities and to get more recognition of cultural rights. Sometimes showing little interest in ideas like transparency and accountability, they were concerned with ways to make the state more responsive to local needs and with reinterpreting history, redefining communities, and revisioning future societies in ways ordinary people want.
Heard enough?
- 23
- tettyan 21.01.06
Hello again Tom,
Suadum’s description of me as “very pro-Toxin/TRT” notwithstanding, I feel the need to say something about this comment from Gadfly1:
Hmmm, I wonder how the folks over at NanaPlaza got the impression that you’re pro-TRT? You usually don’t make direct references to Thaksin or TRT in you blog entries.
Of course Tom, you’re not really a Thaksin partisan. You’re simply against those who just happen to oppose Thaksin now - left-wing NGOs, academics, the anti-government media and the Democrats. Not an unworthy cause in and of itself. After all, many of those NGO leaders saw fit to support Thaksin back when he was out of power, but oppose him now that he’s in power. It’s easy to criticize, but it’s a lot harder to come up constructive ideas of your own. So what do these guys stand for anyhow? They know what they’re against (Thaksin, capitalism, blah blah blah…), but what are they for?
Is this beginning to sound a little familiar? Let me cut to the chase. Tom, we all know what you’re against. But I’d like to hear a little bit more about what you’re for.
Regards,
Tettyan
- 24
- Tom Vamvanij 21.01.06
Tettyan:
Of course Tom, you’re not really a Thaksin partisan. You’re simply against those who just happen to oppose Thaksin now - left-wing NGOs, academics, the anti-government media and the Democrats.
Nice try, but I won’t let you export your politics of personal or group identification to me. I am not against their opposition to Thaksin. At least not the general idea of it, which would be like a blank check in reverse. Rather, when I see populism, nationalism, charlatanism, or opportunism, I condemn it.
The media deserves to be singled out here (and it’s the media tout court, not “anti-government media” — spare me your insinuation already). Two of my favorite posts about the Thai media — “Krugman in Bangkok” and “Rogue Nation Channel and ‘America War’” — have nothing to do with Thaksin or the Thai government. They are currently two of the five recommended on the sidebar. I think I’ve said it before, politicians come and go, but the media remain. And so I’ll continue to decry them as long as they continue to make a travesty of journalism, regardless of which party is in power in Thailand. Same thing with the so-called academia.
On specific issues, it’s just simple logic that, with the exception of rare special cases, someone who criticizes someone else’s criticism of X, must be for X. So I am for capitalism, free trade agreements, alliance with America, and privatization (even a partial one, if that’s what it takes to get started). Is that really so hard to see? Or are you blinded by your own rhetoric?
Even more importantly, I am for real journalism — which is to say truthful, informative, and fair — and real academic scholarship, which requires, for example, an economist to know what “externality” is and that Hugo Chavez is not “neo-liberal”.
I also enjoy debunking, setting the record straight, and pointing out facts that people may not realize.
That’s enough positives for today.
- 25
- Yanal 27.01.06
I agree with tom