Wanted: Grown-up | 30.05.05

Insurgency isn’t a recent phenomenon in Thailand. Islamic separatism, for example, has existed for so long that it was cited as the reason against digging the Kra Canal from the very first time I heard of the project (in primary school, I think).

But even before separatist insurgency (slightly and perhaps relatedly), there was the communist kind. On April 22, 1968 (incidentally exactly one month after PULO was formed), Major-General Saiyud Kerdphol outlined Thailand’s nascent counter-insurgency efforts in a speech to the United States Operations Mission: [from The Struggle for Thailand, p. 34]

What then is the real scope of the insurgency? Intelligence gained from interrogation of arrested and surrendered communist terrorists reveals that a significant number have completed political and military training in China, North Vietnam and Laos. We estimate that between 400 and 500 have been trained in North Vietnam alone. These individuals constitute the movement’s hard-core, which recruits, organizes and trains new members from the villages. Most recruitment is taking place around the “target areas” pin-pointed by CSOC - 14 in the Northeast, one in the Central Region, three in the South and three in the North.

We estimate the total number of full-time terrorists to be about 2,500. If we include sympathizers, the number might reach 25,000. These figures do not, however, include the communist infrastructure, the political organisation which lives unobtrusively in Bangkok and other population centres. Nor do they include the criminal elements operating in remote forest and mountainous areas where insurgency occurs. Many of these criminals are hired to support communist activities and complement the actual number of communist terrorists, adding both an element of confusion and a greater visibility to the basic insurgent threat.

What causes ordinary people to support the terrorist? Our investigations have revealed a number of reasons. Most communist adherents seek a higher income and improved living conditions; some are forced into communist ranks; others fear arrest because they have supported the communists or have been falsely accused of having done so. Only a few have professed a faith in communism as an ideology, and this. I would suggest, is one reason that the terrorists tend to surrender as soon as the “going gets tough” or the security forces launch major suppression operations. The movement lacks ideological backbone.

Jungle-based communist terrorists rely on their sympathizers in the villages for support, in particular, for food. Villagers who assist them do so generally because of family or friendship ties or out of fear of retribution. More substantial financial and material support is normally obtained from urban sympathizers who operate under cover of legitimate business activities. And this latter area is one in which the government must gain more accurate intelligence.

We do know, however, that the terrorists in the forest are, at present, so short of supplies that a decision has been made not to increase the number of jungle-based insurgents. Only those who cannot risk remaining in their villages are now accepted into jungle camps. Other are instructed to remain in the villages to provide food and other support for the jungle-based forces. The seriousness of insurgent support problems is reflected in the fact that higher party echelons are now granting approval for the forceful requisitioning of food from villagers. The assassination of village headmen who refuse to co-operate is also sanctioned.

That was, of course, almost 30 years ago. We are now encountering different perpetrators, with different ideologies, in different circumstances. Still, a General Saiyud would be very useful, if not necessary, today: someone who would acknowledge the problem instead of downplaying it (like both Thaksin and Anand often do), who would try to know the enemies instead of belittling them (Thaksin) or parroting them (Anand), and who would emphasize the distinction between the militants and the villagers they abused instead of anointing the former as the voice of the latter (Anand). Essentially we need a grown-up in charge of internal security. And no, it can’t just be the queen all by herself.

01:01 ▪ politics

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1

Gordon 30.05.05

Interesting article Tom.

I didn’t realize that Thailand had its own struggle against Communism.

I’m not a fan of Thaksin, he’s big trouble for Thailand if you ask me.

Thank’s for the history lesson.

2

Tom Vamvanij 30.05.05

Gordon:

Why is Thaksin big trouble for Thailand? Because he’s populist, nationalist, anti-American, anti-privatization, suppresses the media, and doesn’t play well with academics?

(Hint: you may want to follow the links before answering.)

3

Gordon 30.05.05

Well Tom, I don’t have an inside view of the guy as someone living in Thailand and following the issues more closely might, but from all appearances he seems to be surrounded in corruption.

Do you think otherwise?